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Uganda's Work for Progress complete the advance of East African 
states into the presentation of comprehensive, ambitions plans with fairly 
definite macro and sectoral tergets and directed toward economic develop-
ment including change as well as growth. As with Tanzania's 1964 plan 
and Kenya's 1966 (with appeared a fortnight earlier), Work for Progress 
is the first fully post - independence plan and the first formulated 
on the basis of national governmental goals and development aims as 
opposed to those of external study groups or terminal colonial regimes. 
Work f or Progress may, at the same time, represent a further step: its 
formulation began from and its final versicn is heavily influenced by 
a quantitative analytical model cf the Uganda economy (see P.Clark 
Development Plannijrgin East African, East .African Publishing House for 
EAISR, 1965, Chapters IV and V)„ While the implicit model deriveable 
from the Tanzania Plan is similar (Clark, Chapter VI) and that of the 
revised (nrt the 1964) Kenya Plan may be, neither attempted to use a 
macro - sectoral interrelationship model as a guide to micro - formulation 
and consistency - feasibility tests. 
Yvork for Progress bears the marks of haste in the final stages 
of formulation and harmonization. Macro and sectoral projections needed 
for implementation and deriving from stated or presumptively availkbl'e 
data are absent. More important several problems of accurancy and 
consistency arise on examination of the quantitative tergets (see 
Tabular Appendix)„ These weaknesses are the result of the sudden loss 
of one chief economist (Dr. Yf0J„ Lissowski)and his replacement by 
Dr. B. VanArkadie who undertockmajor revisions in the then existing 
Working Party Report - Draft J/iacro Programme calculations and interpre-
tations. While extremely serious - at least potentially - these 
inconsistencies do not spring from basically faulty analysis nor do they -
at this point - present insurmountable barriers to implementation, 
II. 
Work for Progress is far from being Uganda's first development 
plan - that could be dated to the 1920 Economic Development Commission and 
certainly not later than the 1946 Worthington Plan. Nor is it the first 
plan presented by the present Uganda People's Congress government, the 
First' Eive Year Plan (1961-66) appeared in final form in 1962-63. The 
overall annual real increase goals of 6.3Jo for Gross Domestic Product and 
7.2fo for monetary GDP (excluding self consumed output) set for 1966-71 
are below the rates prevailing in the late 1940's and early 1950's as 
well as since 1962,1966's gross fixed investment target of£35 million 
(l7.7% of monetary GDP) is absolutely only equal to preliminary estimates 
of 1965 investment and as a share of monetary GDP is not only below 1965 
but several years in the 1950's„ 
What, then, is the basis for asserting that Uganda's Second 
Five Year Plan represents a major advance in government economic strategy 
and policy and a signifigant step toward attaining more rapid and sustai-
ned economic progress? If it dies, how seriously can the projected growth 
rates and the physical targets underlying them be taken? What are the 
chances for substantial success in the vital implmentation phase of the 
Plan both as to work put in and economic progress secured? 
The first question can be answered reasonably succinctly and 
definitely. Work for Progress is the first comprehensive Uganda plan in 
two senses. It is set in the framework of a fifteen year perspective 
whose central economic goals are the creation of a structurally modern 
* While the author wishes to express his debt to members of the 
Ministry of Planning and Economic Development for their assistance 
and comments he also wishes to underline both that this paper is 
nc»t based on confidential sources and that he is solely responsible 
for views expressed and conclusions drawn. 
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occurs in Uganda today, it is despite - not because of - inadequate 
exchange of information and utterly inadequate straotures for coordination 
of decision taking as well as implementing. Fourth, a national network of 
bodies and individuals (by no means necessarily or even principally within 
the Ministry) is necessary to apply, coordinate, gain support for, and 
recommend modifications to Work for Progress on the Provincial-District -
Saza levels. Either the Kenya ( probably marginally too "official" and 
too little popular) or the Tanzania (probably marginally too diffuse and 
too little integrated into the planning process) system could provide an 
initial basis for creating a Ugandan pattern. The nature of the choice 
is not independent of what role is planned for the-presently rather weak; 
frogmented, and disorganized at the mass and local levels - UPC. The Kenya 
pattern does not depend on an effective, policy initiating and programme 
prr.posing grass ro-ots party (wisely given the present state of KANU) but 
the Tanzanian does. Fifth, the understanding of the nature of integrated 
planning as a discipline requiring unpopular decisions and policies if 
popular goals are to be attained must be made operationally clear to and 
accepted by all ministers, a substantial majority of signifigant political 
figures, all key public sector economic decision making technocrats, and 
a substantial majority of their senior staffs. One may doubt whether this 
understanding and acceptance now exists to the extent of agreeing to and 
acting on limits in expenditure of their own bodies. The operation of 
the 1966-67 Budget will be a test of how much can be attained how promptly 
in this key area. Uganda's past bursts of economic growth have not proved 
sustainable after the initial export boom impetus faded. From 1955 
through 1962 real monetary output per capita declined steadily. Growth of 
national product has not for an length of time been able to exceed the 
growth rate of exports. T o achieve and maintain growth rates of over 7% 
a year requires.a radical change in this regard given export growth pro-
jections of 4 . 4 T h e new Plan is squarely directed at attaining this 
change primarily by altering the domestic structure of production to 
permit a growing portion of national demand to be met by Ugandan produced 
gocds, thus the emphasis on rapid industrial growth-10.1$ a year for 
1966—71= Financing this change will entail securing a sharp increase in • 
foreign public and private captial transfers which are projected to rise 
from £8.8 million in 1966 to £ 17.0 million in 1971 following a jump from. 
£1.8 million in 1964. 
1966Ts investment target is pitched at the 1965 level because 
1965 represents an export boom generated peak virtually double 1962' s 
£17.7 million. From 1966 onward an 11$ annual growth in investmentiis 
posited as needed for the attainment of the £280 million monetary GDP 
target for 1971. In fact 1965 actual investment was probably about £32.5 
million (£30 million excluding defense as per plan) so an 8% (.17%) 1965-1966 
increase is needed. 
The annual growth of monetary GDP is slated to rise from 6.7% 
in 1966 to 7.8% in 1971 and 7.9% thereafter. These targets are based on 
the self evident-but all too often ignored - premise that capacity for 
economic growth should be increased as part of the process of development. 
To posit constant growth rates throughout a plan period-much more to call 
for a huge initial year leap in either investment or output - is to court 
apparant failure in the first year and/or to aim below possible levels of 
achievement in the final years. 
Development planning is itself a developing art - a very rapidly 
developing one in East Africa, as comparison of the 1961 and 1964 Tanzanian, 
the 1964 and 1966 Kenyan, and the 1962-3 and 1966 Ugandan Plans demonstrates. 
Tanzania's 1964 plan represented a major break-through to basically 
comprehensive and ambitious development planning in the East African 
context. Both 1966 Plans have growth targets and development strategies 
in many ways similar to Tanzania's pioneering effort but both also represent 
advances In implementation programming and pre-preparation of firm sectoral 
and project proposals. 
The que-^ tion^ xif realism and probability of substantial 
attainment require more detailed examination of Work for Progress. 
Uganda's 1955-62 stagnation was not, after all, simply for want of effort. 
Investment actually rose through 1956, the Owen Falls Dam-Jinja industrial 
complex-Uganda Development Corporation developments stemming largely from 
the early vision and energy of Governor Sir John Hall were pushed forward. 
State reserves from the boom period were used to sustain and, in some-
cases, expand social and economic services. What reason is there to 
believe more effective maintenance of growth in the face of slow export 
growth can be achieved now? 
One er-swer, of course, is that the 1950's and early 1960's were 
by no means wasted time so far ss laying a foundation for future develop-
ment is concerned - the ability of the economy to grow ICfo a year from 
1962 to 1965 when supported by a . new export boom demonstrates that, 
Physical infrastructure (reads,, railways, hydroelectric power), human 
capacity (educated high lex el manpower, a more stable and experienced 
wage labour force) nlus the ability be expand it (iealth, education,' 
pure water supplies), institutional competence (UDO, the civil service, 
the planning •machinery itself) the ind atrial base (a not inconsiderable 
£23.6 million ur 12% of monetary GDP in 1966) are all of a very different 
and much higher order to'.ay than in 1954, So too the comprehensiveness 
and potential effectiveness of public policy and c.' political will arid 
ability with a national as opposed to a. colonial government) to secure 
necessary support for effective prosecution and execution of' state policy. 
Ill 
Work f'-r Pr- ess ! i i tsrlooking str; fcegy for rapid economic growth, 
alteration'of the pattern of production, and attaining greater social 
justice through "broader distribution of gains from development turns 
on the attainment o:f substantial implementation in seven policy-programme , 
areas. What is ne x.rd is not precise attainment of each target-indeed, 
unless me' assumes omniscience in rogard to present economic realities . 
and clairvoyance oyer the next five je rs on the part of the planners.', 
exact point by point "fulfillment'! v/ou'd not be an optimal result as 
opposed to system-.tic improvement an I revision within the overall 
implementation pre :ess. 
Plan targets represent-in most cases - a "middle estimate" of m. 
what can be achieved if external econ'mic events (weather, foreign inve-
stment, export prioes) are mixed with some .more, and some less favourable 
than expected and the effectiveness ox investment programmes and of p.ublic 
policy is also a mixture of delays and early successes, of partial 
failures and of attainment of higher output levels than anticipated. 
For central government development spending three targets and phasing 
patterns exist for the plan pericd-the middle or "trend" one already cited, 
a peak to be reached if events are better than could reasonably be expected, 
and a minimum or "core" programme attainable even if there is series of 
unfavourable circumstances beyond Uganda's control. This flexibility 
around apparently precise targets is a source of strength, not simply 
because it means that 10C$ fulfillment of each sub-target is not essential 
to successful Plan implementation, but mor . because it demonstrates the 
Uganda planners1' concept of economic development, planning as a process of 
continuous adjustment to new limits and opportunities within an overall 
set of priorities and goals. Wi thout adjustment, any. plan becomes 
dangerously brittle in implementation, neither able to survive shocks, nor 
to seize new5opportunities. Without an derail priority frame, adjustments 
tend to become random and unco; dinated resulting in a loss of any overall 
sense of"direction and in relatively inefficient a:location of available 
resources in the public and private sectors alike. 
1. Development and Structural Change Goals 
One set of goals is that for changes .in the makeup of production and in 
the techiques used in obtaining it. Even a glance at the 1966-1971-1981 
Gross Domestic Product tables illustrates the growith importance of 
industry (both to generate and to meet higher consumption goods and 
construction material demands) and of construction (to alio?/ physical 
programme implementation). Less immediately evident are the shifts within 
sectors (e.g. among export processing, food manufacture, other manufacture) 
and those dependent on the introduction of new productive techniques. 
The agricultural targets can be met only if application of insecticides 
and fertilizers, use of improved seeds and methods (including more hired 
labour ..and implements), and effective provision of supporting credit move 
ahead on a large scale-affecting say 250,000 of Uganda's 1,000,000 odd 
farming units. Agriculture - with an absolute monetary output growth 
target of£21.2 to industry 'r. £14.5 million illustrates both the limits 
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on change and the degree to which very real changes may be concealed 
within apparantly similar aggregates, 75-80$ of the labour force is 
now engaged in agriculturey at least 55$ of national product directly 
depends cn it if one includes processing and trade in agricultural 
products, 9C$> of normal export revenues are derived from farm products. 
Rapid growth of monetary output, exports, and general living standards r-
require the top priority given to agricultural and rural economy growth 
in output and development of techniques of production in the Plan. The 
makeup of farm output is to change to commercial and away from self-consu-
mption production, to industrial sector raw materials, to higher revenue 
and/or nutritional value items (e.g.. meat, milk). Combined with improved 
methods and sharply increased provision of social and economic services in 
rural areas, the result sought is radical change not merely growth in 
agricultural output within the present rural setting. 
2. Growth Rates 
Growth goals average 70£$ a year for monetary and 3.2$ for self consumed 
product averaging 6.3$ overall for 19G3-71 with higher rates, 8$-3.2$-7.1$ 
respectively, fcr 1971-81. Per capita monetary income is slated to rise 
4.3$ a year in the present and 4. 9$ a year in the next two plan periods. 
Taken by sector, growth goals range from 11.3$ a year in construction 
(or 12,6$ if non-food, non-processing manufacturing is taken separately) 
to 5.1$ for agriculture and animal husbandry. Rather surprisingly, the 
traget for non-governmental services at 7.9$ a year is substantially higher 
than that for government at 7.8%, total monetary product at 7.2%, or produ-
ction of goods at 6.7$. While the creation of a more modern economy does 
tend to alter the makeup and under some circumstances raise the relative 
size of the non-gove:Timental service sector, the commerce, transport, and 
miscellaneous service growth projections look rather high compared with 
those for other sectors. 
Indeed, a strong case exists for constructing a projected 
Resources - Uses flow table and a simplified Imput - Output table for 
1971 to best consistency for sectoral, main quantitative commodity, ana 
import targets. Transport and communication is particularly doubtful -
why this sector should 125$ as fast as goods produced in the fa.ce of 
a declining share of exports (normally transported for greater than 
average distances) and of massive investment likely to reduce real 
transport costs per ten mile is most- unclear. Similarly the 9.3$ growth 
rate of "miscellaneous serviced' may be correct but needs to be supported 
by projections for its key components: education, health, other non-
administrative government, hotels, bars and restaurants, professional. 
The implicit 1971-1981 growth rates by sector look fairly plausible but 
would be strengthened (and probably revised) as a basis for perspective 
planning if a fourth 1971-1981 change in resource allocation and supply 
and in input - output structive study were made from the 1971 estimates. 
Average output per head is to rise from about £33 (£25.7 monetary) in 
1966 to £40. (£31.8 monetary) in 1971 and £61 (£52„6 monetary in 1981. ,J.' 
Self-consumed output per head is expected to rise slightly on the basis 
of improved rural diets and higher quality self-built housing but to fall 
from nearly a quarter to about a seventh of total domestic product by 1981. 
These per capita figures underline how paanfully slow the process of 
increasing the absolute level of average output per person is when the base 
level is very low and includes a substantial self-consumption component. 
The overall GDP grov/th sought by 1981 is £440 million (over 167$ 
of present output) and tha.t of monetary output £402 million (about 200$ of 
the 1966 level).. Over the fifteen year period, the largest absolute 
monetary sector target increase is for agriculture £88.5 million (120$ of 
present Aoutput) while industry and processing is second with £74.7 million 
(over 300$ of the 1966 level). 
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3. InvejB tnent J eve Is 
To achieve the output growth tor-;.etc', investment must 
rise from. £35 million in 1966 to £60 million in'1971 or from 18-
to 21' of total monetary output. To finance this increase, 
annual .clonestic (public and private) savings .will need to increase 
by ,-221.5 million (over a fifth of the total increase in monetary 
production) and net (after increased repo^ i'ient of loans and 
interest-dividend outflows),foreign capital inflow by £3.5 million 
a year in 1971 compared with- 1966. 
If these goals are to he net, a massive mobilization 
of resources hy the state, the para-statal bodies, and the 
private sector will he needed. The 23 b rate, of domestic • savings 
out of increased monetary output called for is virtually twice 
the 12% "base rate of 1966 domestic savings to monetary GDP. A 
five year central government surplus of £30 million over re-
current expenditure (financed "by higher taxes), maintained and " 
increased para-statal organization profits and securing of foreign 
investment 'or loans, and increases in all forms of private 
savings (including, e.g. social security and insurance) as well ' 
as farm sector -savings to repay productivity raising loan are 
integral and vital plan goals'. 
In fact the investment requirements appear to he 
seriously understated.on four heads; defense, non-investment 
recurrent, inventories, .and rural private, while the under-
statements probably do not render Work for Progress1 goals 
unattainable to any signifigant degree tluey aill greatly tighten-
the constraints operative in domestic public revenue and in 
foreign balance as well as lowering the a parant possible rate 3 -
of increase of per capita monetary consum ;tion from 3.1% to 
2.8% (See Tables 4-5-6.) » 
Defense non-re current spending - buildings and military 
hardware - is not included in the Plan either under government 
recurrent or investment. This means a pari passu understatement 
of government revenue needs and overstatement of allowable 
consumption by the full amount (perhaps £9 million minimum) on 
the Plan. Further as 75-90$ of such spending has been on imported 
hardware quite serious balance of payments problens seem likely 
to arise on recalculation. Quite apart from the need for re-
calculating to account for actual probable spending, it is vital 
that Defense "investment", be bought within the Plan viewed.as 
a national resource budget. In 1965 it accounted for almost a 
quarter of public Development account spending and may be a 
sixth in 1966. Unless restraints are imposed rising Defense 
spending on Development account can swamp or cripple Work for 
Progress ? implementation. 
Government non-investment development spending is 
not treated consistently. It appears in government sector Plan 
finance requirements but not in the implicit 1971 resource 
allocation pattern. Again this results in understating needed 
growth in national savings plus recurrent government and over-
stating possible consumption growth (by £10 million over 1966-1971). 
Inventory investment is lumped with consumption. If 
estimated at 20 j of additional monetary G-DP it will come to £6,4 
million over the Plan period. Assuming that productive sector 
increases are made and that credit development (woefully under-
analyzed in Work for;.Progress) does take .lace no problems , are 
likely ,to arise on the domestic inventors?" side. In regard, to 
imports greater difficulties might appear. Although the negative 
rate of increase of consumer goods imports --sited (zero for 
manufactures, negative other consumer oods) should mean no net 
increases in that sector, this does not -Id lor raw materials, 
fuel, construction materials, or capital poods. 
-7— 
Private rural investment ..is vastly under stated -
probably "by £25-30 million (assuming Plan target fulfillment 
on the output side..).; However, on the order of•three quarters 
of this represents direct labour and natural growth (land 
improvement, minor facilities,, tree.crops, ^ livestock). 
Only £5-6 million (wages fund, productive input fund, other 
working capital, tools) is likely to require reallocation of 
cash income from consumption. How "big a boost this is is is very 
unclear as.such investment is not now estimated.but, 
assuming the success of the public rural development programme, 
this £25-30 million should be self generating. 
Investment in rental buildings also looks low but 
by how much is difficult to estimate. The danger here is 
that private savings will be sucked into high income housing 
construction and away from more critical areas. 
Recalculations of this nature suggest £280 million 
(plus £10 million non-investment development and £10 million 
defense investment) not £230 million investment requirements. 
It may be worth noting that the figure gives, a 
Gross Incremental Capital Outpuc Ratio of 3.4 and on Agricul-
tural are of 2.4 - both signifigantly more probable than the 
2.8 and 1.0 of the Plan's own figures. The net ratios are 
probably on the order of 2.4-2.5 and 2.0 respectively for 
the., adjusted totals. 
Added cash investment needs are on the order of 
£25-30 million (£15 plus million in inventories) plus £20 
million in non-investment Development (largely rural pro-
ductivity raising) and Defense. The 30.4$ incremental o 
savings rate needed for investment side appears attainable 
(it Is actually only a 20$ odd rate for added private savings 
to. added private post . tax -monetary income). The; -oroblem 
lies with the government' £20 million whose covering implies 
that 1971 public revenues from domestic sources must be of 
the order of £72.5 - 75 million, or £2-5 million above 
the Plan's implicit projection. Part of the problem here 
is the 1965-1966 base including a £1.6 million 1965-66 
Recurrent Deficit and a £5 million odd 1965-66 -marketing c 
board deficit. Even the stringent 1966-67 Budget and 
the anticipated 1966-67 Cotton-Coffee price slashes leave 
a government/board deficit of at least £1.5 million for 
1966 is a surplus (on Recurrent expenditure toward all 
Development spending including non-investment and Defense) 
of £10"million required by 1971. The gap in present Plan 
projections of revenue and domestic borrowing and adjusted 
spending requirements is on the order of £17.5-25 million 
over 1966-7." 
4. Foreign Balance ' _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ r 
Balance of payments targets turn on securing a 4.4A 
rate of growth in merchandise exports and a 9.3$ annual rate 
for invisibles (transport, tourism, etc.), holding the growth 
of merchandise imports to 5.7$ a year, and securing a 14$ per 
year increase in gross foreign capital inflows. Of these the 
import limitation goal - which is to be backed by quantitative 
import controls if necessary - is the most demanding. If import 
growth rates are to be held to 80$ (actually hear nil for con-
sumer goods imports given the rapid Increases in capital goods 
and industrial sector inputs required by other Plan goals) of 
monetary product rates, industrial and agricultural diversification 
physical targets must be met both in terms of absolute volume and 
of turning out goods qualitatively acceptable at prices within a 
10-20$ range of"those now prevailing for imports (including tariff). 
If, however, consumer imports rise much faster than planned, the 
basic problem may not be bhe resultant balance of payments crisis. 
Rather, the import increases will be both a cause and a sign of 
serious failures on the consumer goods growing, processing, and 
manufacturing fronts. 
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Examination of external balance details (see Table 6) 
confirms this view but also poses additional problems, raw material, 
fuel, construction material, and capital goods imports are to rise by 
40 to 75$ are 1966-1971, adequate to support major investment and modern 
.sector current production increases. But the zero growth target for 
consumer manufactives means substitution, for mass manufactives as 
rapid as increased imports of more complex consumer goods. In the case 
of food imports - posited to fall-substitution is apperantly posited for 
a really substantial share of Kenyan grain - dairy - livestock - tunned 
products. 
The reallocation of the "Coverage Adjustment" to the sectors 
probably causing it reduces the allowable growth rate of imports to 
5.1$ (i.e. an import income elasticity of .7 vis a vis monetary GOP) 
and of non-government transfers over - 12$. The latter - implicicly invo-
lving ending of remittances by non-Ugandan african workers - is palpably 
implausible. 
The payments figures as presented are apparantly on a trend 
basis. If the uncovered external deficit is so calculated it comes to 
£ 12.1 million (without any adjustment for the investment - resource 
imbalance noted above) for 1966-1971 reaching 0 in the last year. 
With January 1966 basic free reserves of under £15 million (government 
about £13.5 million but less £2.0 million sinking fund specific reserves 
and £3.2 million over-draft plus perhaps £5 - 5.5 million net due on 
Currency Board decomposition) this trend cannot be followed. 1966's 
estimated (probably conservatively) loss of £4 million already creates a 
situation in which the Bank of Uganda's currency backing requirement (4C$-
£9.5 - 10.0 million) leaves neither.adequate free reserves for even 
seasonal fluctuations nor a margin to cover needed currency expansion to 
go with growing monetary GOP. 
Common market export - import projections appear both doubtful 
of attainment and of political acceptability if attained. 6.2$ for 
export growth certainly depends on sharp sugar export expansion (is 1964 
to 1966 collopse) and even so may be unrealistic in that several bulk 
exports e.g. cotton seed oil, tobacco, textiles cannot be expected to 
perform this well. Assuming the export target is reached a growth rate 
of East African imports to Uganda of no more than 4$ is consistent with 
unworsenaB. trade deficit with the Gmmon market. If attainable this 
target must imply heavy reduction in food (including processed food) and 
clothing - shoe exports from Kenya slightly mere than balanced by 
increased imports of mere complex manufactures plus a mere rapid growth 
of imports from Tanzania (currently in deficit with Uganda by about £1 
million on goods account). Any other pattern is most unlikely to prove 
consistent with continued East African economic community viability. 
An interesting point emerges in foreign private capital. In 
1966 reinvested earnings are larger (£2 .0 is £1.8 million) than net 
i nflcsy while even in 1971 they will oonstitute about 90$ of it (£3.4-3.6 
of £ 3.8 million). Over the 1966-1971 period they appear to run to 
£14 of £15 million. This suggests that a combination of fiscal 
incentives to reinvest in Uganda plus specific arrangements, e.g. via 
UDC, for technically needed foreign private investment - management -
expertise packages not general "foreign investment incentives" is 
the more promising route in regard to this sector. 
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5. Social Justice 
Work for Progress reiterates the need for accepting develo-
pment as requiring sacrifices as well as yielding benefits. From 
this follows its fifth set of goals-those for social justice in 
sharing of benefits ana sacrifices. Tax policy is to be based on 
the principle of higher absolute and relative demands on those with 
well above average incomes. Benefits-so far as is consistent with 
maintaining the rate of growth which is their source-are to be 
distributed widely. 
Examination of programmes - especially in agricultural loans, 
outgrower schemes, and extension services, cooperative and community 
development, health, education, rural water supply, and social security-
indicates social justice has been a serious criterion in Plan formula-
tion. While the low base level of incomes and of services limits both 
the quality and coverage in the fields cited, in each of them Work for 
Progress' targets represent very real advances in how .many Ugandans 
are assisted how much in increasing their incomes and/or their general 
welfare. 
6. Employment Goals 
One of the requisites of social justice is opportunity to 
earn a living. With agriculture expected to grow less rapidly than 
the overall economy, an urgent need exists to increase the level of 
non-agriCultural wage and salary employment-now about 239,000 which 
is 9% of total labour force or 5c/o of population. Both of these 
ratios arc lower than in 1950 while the total employment is 
absolutely about the same as in 1964. 
Plan estimates call for 62,000 new wage and salary posts 
outside agriculture (as 4 . r a t e of increase) and 58,000 in it 
(including "out growers "a 7% growth target). Between 1966 and 1971 
about one fourth of the net increase in the labour force (perhaps 
80,000 annually) can be employed in wage and salary jobs. This 
ratio-while far better than the 9% base- is not satisfactory, even 
assuming that monetary farming can absorb one quarter of the net 
additions leaves almost one half to enter basically subsistence 
agriculture over 1966-71. 
largely the difficulty arises from the present employment 
ba.se and economic structure. To build a modern economy productivity 
per worker must be raised. Work for Progress implicitly calls for 
an increase of 3.3fo a year in output per non-agricultural wage and 
salary worker. While limiting-or appearing to limit- employment 
growth in the short run, a sustained increase in productivity is 
essential to attaining the high levels of output per capita which 
are requisite for high living standards. To create jobs by fiat 
or by using production methods which leave output per worker 
staganant or falling is not a highread to development but a dead 
end. 
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The overall productivity increase goal is in 
itself surprisingly high given the proposed C/0 ratio. 
By sector some of Its components appear f n r too high 
e.g. electricity, government administration, construction, 
manufacturing, and probably transport and communication. 
(See Table 7.). In the case of construction this may 
represent a policy decision to substitute capital for labour, 
to save construction time (and make up for days in 
preplanning of construction programmes) as much as money 
(or a fortiori real resources). If so, the decision should 
be reconsidered. Overall these ratios suggest that a rather 
more ambitious set of employment targets may be attainable 
if public policy is altered to end subsidizing the sub-
stitution of capital for labour, e.g. by making tax credits 
dependent on jncrease in capacity not of physical Investment. 
The high level manpower projections are not 
particularly convincing. Their apparent precision is 
purely the result of calculating techniques and is highly 
misleading. On balance they may be conservative. This 
is as well in that the addition of plan educational output 
targets plus present levels of private candidates and 
overseas students yields manpower surpluses at all leve_ls 
for 1966-1971 and gross "over-production" thereafter if the 
demand projections are correct. These, if real, can be 
absorbed by highly desireable upgrading, e.g. of primary 
teachers and clerks-. However, that implies radical lowering 
of the average starting income for all levels of educational 
attainment, a move which will be intensely unpopular and 
put very severe strain on the incomes (wages and salaries) 
policy. 
Adjusting for the revised investment - public 
development expenditure needs suggests th-'t 5.4'n monetary 
(2.8$ per capita) and 4.7$ overall (2.1$ per capita) 
limits are more realistic. These are still - on the 
macro level - quite comfortable. Two goals are set for 
distributing increased consumption; providing incentives 
for achieving higher productivity (via promotion and skill 
differentials) and ensuring more rapid growth of low than 
of high incomes. Overall, growth in money incomes must 
be held to rates consistent with those of the rise in goods 
and services available. Failure in this respect - leading 
to rapid price inflation - would create serious 'balance of 
payments difficulties, hamper the growth of public sector 
savings, and redistribute income away from the lowest Income 
groups-particularly small farmers. 
(1CA Here) 
Work For Progress presents and faces the fact of limited 
available increases in consumption consistent with rap'"id and 
sustained growth. The policy set out is one of limiting wage 
and salary rate increases to 1.7$ a year with the rate 
3.5$ for those in the under L 90 a year income group and 
0$ for the over L 600 salary category. Implicit patterns 
of money income and consumption expenditure growth can be 
derived for the entire monetary economy. Wage and salary 
incomes are to rise 9$ a year (largely from increases in 
numbers employed), cash agricultural earnings 5$, and other 
self employed-rent-profits incomes by perhaps 7.5'j a year. 
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7. Inc one s_ Pol icy 
If the growth goals (or limits) for domestic 
product, public consumption (8 " a year), domestic 
savings, and overseas capital payments are attained, 
a 5.0r" Plan rate of growth in total real consumption 
and 5.8-1 in real monetary consumption will he possible 
consistent with meeting foreign balance targets and 
avoiding rapid price increases. Per capita the overall 
annual growth can be 3. 5'% a year. The absolute increase 
sought are ,-S40.5 million in monetary and 551.5 million 
in total consumption over the period 1966-71. I,ike otber 
Plan targets these are in real terms net of tax or 
other price changes. 
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A1 lowing for higher taxes and rates of domestic savings 
the accompanying increases in consumption should he 8Ti 
for wage and salary earners, 4.5$ for farmers, and 5% for 
other self employed and property income recipients. 
(See Tahle 4 - C) 
Per capita, the annual growth in consumption works 
out at 2.5-3% for wage m d salary earners, 2 to 2.5$ for 
other self employed and property income recipients, and 
2$ for farmers. While distinctly more equitable than those 
of the recent past these trends still leave a very large 
body of low income farmers as not only the poorest segment 
of the Uganda population but also the one with the lowest 
rates of increase in cash incomes. 
Government services received are higher in relation 
to personal consumption for low than for high income groups; 
their expansion during the Plan period will increase 
distributional equity. However, urban populations are 
better served than rural resulting in a further gap between 
wage and farm incomes. 1966-71 expenditure programmes 
are designed to reduce the relative gap between urban and 
rural levels of public services per capita but in health 
and access to secondary education In particular it will 
remain wide. Progress toward social justice in this 
field is limited both by the size of the rural population 
and the difficulties of serving scattered as opposed to 
concentrated bodies of people. 
IV 
The goal sets of Work for Progress are basically 
consistent with each other, appropriate to the overall 
development strategy stated, and inherently attainable. 
Planning, however, must be primarily implementation if it 
is to have signifigant value - formulation of relevant, 
feasible, and consistent goals is not an end in itself. 
At least four basic conditions are necessary for 
plan implementation: a real commitment to the plan by a 
government with a broad base of consent and adequate powers 
to implement its policies in all economically signifigant 
parts of its territory; planning machinery with lines 
of communication and staff capable of guiding, assisting, 
and reshaping the process of development; a set of policies 
and projects relevant to the major overall and sectoral 
goals as well as being individually practicable; ability 
to identify and act to overcome key probles. 
Initial political commitment to the Second Uganda 
Pirn exists. In most of Uganda the same can be said of the 
government's basis of consent and at least in principle -
administrative ang programmatic institutions. However, 
district and kingdom level governmental operations have been 
dangerously ineffective and ill coordinated (within the 
areas and with the centre alike). In Buganda both the base 
of consent and the effectiveness of government action are 
causes for concern. 
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Several provisions of the April Constitution - as well as 
measures taken since the May suppression of the attempted 
Buganda insurrection-are directed at attaining more 
efficient, coordinated, and inclusive governmental machinery 
and operation patterns, as well as ensuring that the writ 
of the Uganda government runs throughout Uganda. The 
success of these measures is vital to Plan implementation. 
Uganda's planning machinery is on paper institutiona-
lly extremely well developed. In practice, its scope and 
effectiveness Is still limited "by personnel and data 
availability problems and by established bureaucratic 
procedures and attitudes. , The Ministry of Economic 
Development and Planning has substantial power over 
determing public development spending during implementation 
as well as during formulation, direct access to the Cabinet 
and the President and potentially a fairly well built 
network of personal and institutional channels to important 
decision makers in other, government units, para-statal 
agencies, and a number of key private firms or groups. 
These channels are at least as important for implementation 
as for formulation. They alone can provide a detailed, 
up to date picture of economic developments, indicate what 
policy .and programme actions are most likely to result in 
desired public and private sector resource use decisions, 
and build up a broad base of economic decision maker 
commitment to Plan fulfillment. 
Several gaps exist today In this network of control, 
influence, and information-gaps at least partly related to 
the uneven quality of certain Plan sections. District and 
kingdom level government has not been involved in formulation 
and is not yet seen as deeply involved in implementation of 
the national Plan as opposed to very loosely coordinated and 
quantitatively marginal district plans. Para-statal bodies 
do not provide adequate information-especially in the form 
of annual forecasts of output, employment, purchases, 
investment, and profits- and their policies do not always 
appear effectively coordinated with overall national develop-
ment goals. Public understanding and involvement in 
economic development planning has been decidedly sketchy. 
The' extensive radio" and press publicity recived by the 
Plan (albeit rather unfortunately overshadovired by political 
developments) represents a start In this last regard. Some 
form of district development committee with both official 
and unofficial members linked to development officers 
servicing and advising on district level efforts to 
implement at., and supplement the national Plan is needed both 
to ensure public' understanding and involvement and to 
create an active spread of implementation effort out from 
Entebbe-Kampala to the district and gombolola levels. 
Within Work for Progress both the relevance of 
most individual programmes and policies to the main goals 
and the individual and joint feasibility and realism of 
a majority of projects are high. 
-13-
These points would be more readily evident end subject to more 
precise discussion were more project details included in the 
printed volume. Their absence is a weakness which could have 
unfortunate consequences if it either leads the private 
sector to doubt the Plan's seriousness or to be uncertain as 
to precisely what demands and opportunities will result from 
public sector action. There is already some evidence of such 
doubts in the critical construction industry. 
Agricultural programmes cover a wide front in terms 
of crops, geographic and functional areas, number of farmers 
to be affected, and variety of organizational techniques to be 
employed. It is noteworthy that productivity promotion tied 
to Improved inputs and linked to loan finance and Intensive 
extension service work should be available to obout one sixth 
(nearly 170,000) of all Ugandan farmers during the Plan, a 
truly phenomenal increase over past levels. More general 
extension work and provision of subsidized fertilizer, insecti-
cide, and seeds should allow at least one third of all farmers 
to make really substantial advances in cash output. As a trend 
rate, 5.1$ seems a somewhat conservative goal-barring collapse 
of prices on the world cotton and coffee or the East African 
sugar, tobacco, and vegetable oil markets. 
Industry and power totals are also derived in a 
conservative manner. Feasibility projections by classes of 
goods have been based on demand and production cost estimates 
and, in summing, leeway has been allowed for delays or cancella-
tions. Three major projects are doubtful-nitrogenous 
fertilizer (because East African cannot support both the Uganda 
and Kenya projected plants), integrated iron and steel pro-
duction (partly dependent on Eastern .bfrican Economic Community 
development and likely to be delayed into the 1971-76 period), 
and Nile Dam Number 2 (not needed until well into the 1970's 
if the fertilizer project is cancelled and the iron and steel 
postponed). However, T/hile cancellation of the first and 
delay of the second two projects would reduce investment by 
over £20 million, it would not greatly lower either 1971 or 
1981 domestic product and, in fact, might signifigantly ease 
the strain on domestic saving^ and on the balance of payments 
between 1966 and 1971. Small scale industry's growth, on the 
other hand, appears very cautiously projected and results 
should exceed the target. 
Investment in human capacity is centered on secondary 
and higher education - i.e. on expansion of middle and high 
level manpower. By 1971 the rate of graduation fr-m secondary 
level institutions and universities will be well above new 
and replacement middle and high level post requirements if the 
ambitious expansion programme can be carried out. In health 
sharp expansion of hospital capacity is United with an 
imaginative mass curative-preventitive - health education 
programme based on expanding the number of rural clinics toward 
one per gombo'lola. 
Taken as a whole, the education programme seems 
rather too traditional in outlook. Possible roles and inter-
relationships of adult education, agricultural extension, 
radio and television, community development, community centres, 
and health-nutrition education are nowhere treated in a 
coordinated manner and, by and large, the individual items 
receive both inadequate attention and funds. The aim of such 
an approach would be to secure a rapid and major impact on 
the levels of education, involvement, and efficiency of the 
adult population outside the formal school system - an aim which 
would appear in accord with both the rur"l development and social 
justice goals of the Plan. Both In terms of raising rural 
welfare and of aiding in the development of rural productivity, 
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nutrition deserves explicit attention. Practicable pro-
grammes - especially in regard to vegetable and animal 
protein products - do appear to exist and foreign aid for 
their investigation and financing is probably available. 
Construction, commerce, private sector operating 
institutions (especially cooperatives), \nc! financial bodies -
policies - channels are not adequately handled. If - as seems 
to be the case - time and data wore lacking, fuller studies 
aimed at creating a cleaner picture of present realities and 
desireable policies should be a priority for the Ministry's 
implementation preparation.. The cooper -.tivo sector, for 
example, is at least suspect as to overall efficiency and 
managerial capacity. Increasing these would allow more rapid 
increases in rural real incomes and increase agricultural 
production incentives. It could also allow for more rapid 
entry of Africans into small scale manufacturing, repair 
shop, modern service, and commercial activity on a self-supporting 
basis. Here as in the other sectors cited much more adequate 
(or more adequately coordinated and analyzed) knowledge is 
a precondition for effective coordinated development policy 
formulation - and a fortiori for implementation. Physical 
infrastructure programmes require further scrutiny and evalua-
tion not because of evident gaps but to reexamine the cases for 
certain major projects of doubtful priority. Transport in-
vestment at £40 million is astoundingly high (either in light 
of Uganda's present facilities and future needs or of projected 
1966-71 increases In national product generated in the transport 
sector) and major segments of it of very doubtful economic 
vo.lue. The logic of raising two presently motorable roads to 
Gulu to tarmac status to compete with and duplicate capacity 
of the Main Tororo-Gulu Line (which will at best break even) 
is not evident. Equally, either major highway improvements or 
rail extension to Arua is needed for West Nile development but 
not both. The PA. 5 million for airport expansion appears even 
less justified. Entebbe Airport can handle intercontinental jets 
already and its terminal facilities, while rather austere, are 
functional. The three outlying airports included in the Plan d.o 
not generate a signifigant quantity of business now and there is 
no reason to expect them to by 1971. To. inagurate Friendship 
service to them would only involve Uganda in unrewarding airport 
Investment and East African Airways in operating losses. Perhaps 
£1 million for Entebbe upgrading is needed but not more and. no 
case has been nr.de for any expenditure on other airports. If, 
as may be the case, Kampala-Entebbe highway improvement is 
lumped totally or partially under airports the case for up to 
£2 million on Entebbe "airport" can be made. 
An extensive (800 miles) and well planned, feeder road 
provision programme is included. However, substitution of feeder 
roads for, say, • the Soroti-Gulu tarmac road (keeping the Kampala-
G-ulu one) and for either the Pakwach-Arua rail extension or the 
highway rebuilding to Arua should prove more economically 
efficient. The claim that it would, be politically unpopular 
with voters appears a trifle odd - the farmer needing a feeder 
road to increase his ease of reaching a selling point is un-
likely to be angry if it is provid.ee! rather than a distant high-
way paralleling a rail line. District and parliamentary poli-
ticians may overvalue highways vs feeder roads, this is no reason 
to assume the rural electorate does. In the administrative and 
security programmes, £9 million for police rnd prisons looks 
distinctly high. Granted Uganda is und.erpoliced., has a high 
(by African standards even if not by urban North American) rate of 
crimes of violence, and has skimped on investment in t ese fields 
in the past. The question remains whether Uganda can really afford 
to d.evote almost a tenth of government development spending to 
internal security. 
Six major problem areas can be identified as posing particularly-
serious obstacles to Uganda's development efforts: population growth, 
incomes' policy, government taxation and expenditure target fulfillment, 
maintaining a flow of projects ready for implementation and of negotiated 
aid and investment agreements for operation, holding import expansion to 
the low projected growth rate, and maintaining-expanding East and Eastern 
African economic community relationships. Doubts as to political awareness 
of the problem's importance center on the first; on several' of the others 
awareness is already coupled' with initial implemntation or correction 
directed action. 
Population growth to 1981 is assumed to be constant at about 
2.5$ a year. With sharp improvement in health facilities (including 
health education and pure water) planned, a constant rate is plausible 
only if there is reason to expect a signifigant fall in the birth rate 
within the next decade. Even 2.5$ population increa.se a year will reduce 
the possible rates of growth per capita .and drastically raise the costs 
of making basic social services available to the entire population. In a 
limited number of districts it could create an acute land shortage by 
1981. Work for Progress alludes to some of these issues fleetingly but 
nowhere tackles them-a sharp and disquieting contrast With the endorsement 
of and support for family planning set out in the 1966 Kenya Plan. 
Incomes policy fulfillment requires a firm and restrictive 
attitude to all wages claims and a virtually uniform rejection of all 
salary claims. While the recent revisions of certain civil service salary 
scales (downward) is a hopeful signpost, the acceptance of the Norrington 
report for university- faculty ( providing both for sharp increases and an 
unsound system of determing the overall scale) is not. If an income 
restraint policy is to prove workable and viable some control will need to 
be exerted (ideally by discussion and indirect inducements) on private 
sector wages, salaries, prices, and pror'it margins. Perhaps the most 
explosive single issue is the necessity of reducing the cotton price to 
growers from .60 to .55- .40 to eliminate the present very large deficit. 
None of these steps will prove easy or politically popular in and of 
itself-the overall impact of the incomes policy in regard to steady 
growth in per capita consumption and distributive justice will be popular 
but neither speedily attained nor popularly attributed to the income 
restraint measures. 
Government recurrent expenditure must be held to an average 
annual growth of 8$ and recurrent revenue rise by about 10$ - per plan. 
Tc cover the defense investment total the growth rate probably needs to 
be 11-12$ and the 1970-71 surplus of domestic revenue over recurrent 
expenditure on the order of £9-10 million. This is an extremely demanding 
programme especially on the revenue side. 
The 1966-67 Budget if achieved (and combined with viable 
cotton-coffee price revisions) provides a firm start. The Draft Estimates -
including proposed new taxes of £4 million plus semi-new April impositions 
totalling £.5 million - show a surplus of domestic revenue over Recurrent 
expenditure of £5,4 million is a 1965-66 actual deficit of £1.6 million 
(budgeted at over £2.,0 million). This would represent about £7.0 million 
of a total needed change in balance of £10.6 - 11.6 million (from - 1.6 to 
9-10) over 1965-66/1970 —71. However, the Recurrent estimates are so tight 
e.g. in Health and in approved post filling in general as to suggest 
expenditure will exceed estimates by £1-1.5 million. Revenue may also 
exceed but probably .by less, On balance, a £4.2 - 5.0 million surplus 
can be attained if firm control is maintained - including ironclad public 
sector salary policy and an only slightly less inflexible wages policy. 
The taxes imposed are - by and large - progressive in impact. 
However, they do not increase the buoyancy of tax revenue vis a vis 
monetary GDP much (it appears to be as low as r6-,7) and do add to the • 
complexity of consumer levies. A strong case exists for a "wholesale sales 
tax" (collected once at factory, import, or wholesale point) of 4-6$ both 
to increase buoyancy and progressivety (assuming domestic unprocessed 
food is excluded) up to £500 and a series of stiff luxury taxes (expensive 
clothing and household furnishings, radiograms and records, wines and 
spirits, electrical appliances, antomobiles, photographic equipment) of 
25-75$ on top of present import rates. These would also add to buoyancy 
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and be progressive to £2,500 - 3,000 beyond which surtax can be effective. 
Income tax rates are satisfactory - collection is not. 
Avoidance and evasion by professionals, small firms-, and major companies 
(presumptively basically avoidance in the last case) requires both mere 
enforcement and auditing staff and a key hanafull of first rate company 
tax accountants and lawyers. While costly such a program should raise 
net income tax receipts substantially. 
What the planners thought on tax policy is unclear. The tradition 
of Treasury dominance was adhered to - at least so far as publication 
goes. This is unfortunate as an Indication of broad lines of tax change 
over 5-15 years is an integral part of any comprehensive plan ond 5-15 
year forecasts do not have the drawbacks of 6-8 month leaks of Budget 
details. 
The 1966-67 Develpment estimates are £17.4 million on a basis 
comperable to Work for Progress and £19.7 million including Defense. 
Attainment should be safely within the £12-18 million range called for 
in plan phasing but the £15 million "trend" target (excluding defense) 
may not prove attainable, Allowing a 20fo shortfall £14 million (up from 
a comperable £10.5-11.0 million in 1965-66) seems probable. This is a 
perfectly workable start - something the 'Tanzania plan with its very «dd 
phasing and poor pre-preparation for implementation did not have. 
Project studies for the public sector are, by and large, 
moderately well advanced. Indeed the £90 million trend target for 
government development spending (£80 million investment, £10 million 
productivity raising non-investment programmes) Y/as selected from a 
proposed project list originally approaching £150 million and trimmed 
to £106 million or about the present "peak" target. Negotiations on 
aid are well advanced with 1962-66 discussions and agreements providing 
a rolling start. Private sector feasibility studies and public research 
in support of them require more energetic prosecution, although a series 
of ventures initiated or under active negotiation by the UDC as well as 
the I'/Jahdvan: and Iilehta groups (both alone and jointly with foreign 
partners) suggest signifigant private and para-statal industrial and 
processing sector momentum. 
However,the detail of preparation and the feasibility or viabi-
lity study status of projects varies widely. In sop sectors a number 
are of "projects" are titles only. However, this category probably does 
not exceed 5$ of the total. Some sectors e.g. agriculture, wa.ter 
development are fairly completely programmed with at least partially 
evaluated and moderately detailed projects. The minimum requirement 
of 1.5-2 years projects ready for implementation is almost certainly 
met by the plan as a whole and most sectors individually. 
The difficulty is now in establishing detailed priorities and 
alternative phasing patterns overall and by sector, in ensuring that 
the evaluation and aid procurrement processes keep the activateable 
project stockpile at 1.5-2 years and that ministerial and District -
Provincial planning ."teams" (however constituted and administered 
e.g. centering on the DC) are established and involved in implementation 
and revision. These oioerations are rendered difficult much more by 
lack of adequate personnel (now and in the past) than by the present 
status of projects and data being inherently unsound for the first six 
months of plan implementation. African regional economic developments 
can be critical for Uganda. Nitrogenous fertilizer plant "competition" 
with Kenya is symptomatic of broader problems. Uganda's gains from the 
East African Common Market center on sugar, vegetable oil, tobacco, and 
textile exports. All face ra.ther uncertain futures in the light of 
Kenyan and Tanzanian plans. Expansion of gains depends on securing at 
least some signifigant East or Eastern Africa market directed industries 
e.g. iron and steel. The Plan strategy should put Uganda in a position 
to benefit from broader and more planned economic community in East and 
or Eastern Africa. 
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The attainment of such communities depends both on the contents of the 
Philip Commission's Report and their acceptability to the Heads of State 
and on the speed with which the Economic Community of Eastern Africa 
(Zambia through the Sudan) becomes operational. On both fronts present 
indications are moderately hopeful, but substantial political and technical 
effort will be needed to realize the 6}o annual growth of exports to Kenya 
and Tanzania and the creation of signifigant new or expanded trade links 
with the Sudan, the Congo, Ethiopia, and Zambia are to be achieved as 
posited in the Plan-
Work for Progress lives up to its title. It is a signifigant 
step toward speeding and broadening the development process in Uganda. 
The Uganda government and its planners have accepted the twin realities 
that political economy (including development planning) is the art of 
attempting the difficult but possible and that one of the present 
possibilities is allocating resources to expand the range and rate of 
development possible in 1971. The machinery provided for implementation .. 
and the built in leeway for contingencies give Uganda's Second Five Tear 
Plan a very real possibility of substantial fulfillment. The greatest 
danger is that the high costs and maddeningly slow early progress of 
development from a low initial base (both underlined in Work for Progress) 
may erode the necessary base of political commitment and popular support. 
The active prosecution of implementation early in the Plan period leading 
to tangible evidence that development planning can work is the best 
guarantee against such erosion, indeed ultimately it is the only one. 
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TABULAR APPENDIX: 
1. REAIJ GROWTH OP GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 
2. GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT BY SECTOR 
3. INVESTMENT PROJECTIONS 1966 - 1971 
4. GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT ALLOCATION 
5. RESOURCE MOBILIZATION/INVESTMENT SOURCE AND USE 
6. BALANCE OP PAYMENTS PROJECTIONS 
7. EMPLOYMENT/LABOUR FORCE/MANPOWER 
These tables are computed from Work for Progress, 
Background to the Budget 1966-67, The Real Growth of the 
Economy Of Uganda 1954-1962. Adjustments are noted 
following each Table. 
2 
TA.BLE 1 - REAL GROWTH OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 
ANNUAL GROWTH 
OF G. D. P 
It 
ANNUAL GROWTH 
G.D.P PER CAPITA 5 
Monetary Total Monetary Total 
1954-1962 
(1960 Prices)2 1.4$ 1.9$ -1.1$ 6$ I 
; 
11962-1965 
















1 j 1 
1966-19814 
Plan/Perspective 
7.7$ 3.2$ 4.9$ 4.1% 
NOTES: l) Real G.D.P. is defined as the total of domestic product 
for domestic use deflated to "base year prices and 
exported product at current prices. The "real" export 
component of G.D.P. is the foreign exchange earnings not 
the physical volume. Work For Progress 1966-1981 data 
are on this basis, earlier years have been (somewhat 
roughly) corrected. 
2) The method of deflation used in Real Growth and Back-
ground To Budget is not satisfactory. Manufacturing, 
Construction, Services in general, and Government are 
deflated by input not output prices with totally 
inadequate corrections for productivity changes. Especially 
after 1960,this understates the real growth e.g. the 1966 
deflator for Miscellaneous Manufacturing (base 1960) is 
1.54 implying a much higher rate of price increase than 
has, in facta occurred. The total overdeflation may be 
of the order of £5-7 million over 1962-1965. This would 
raise the growth rates to about 10.2$ - 8.2$ - 7.4$ -5,5$ 
respectively. The 1954-1962 affect would be lower, possi-
bly on the order of .5$, for a.nnual monetary G.D.P. growth ~ 
thus not altering the negative per capita sign. 
3 
3) The price change assumptions are 0 for domestic 
production for domestic use end for imports and - 2$ 
per annum for exports (at least for 1966-1971 in this 
case). Consistency - especially in the Balance of Payments 
Tahle - is dependent either on these specific rates or 
parallel changes e.g. a + 1$, + 1$, - 1$ pattern would 
not tend to produce distortions hut + 2$, 1 1$, - would. 
4) The 1966-1981 growth of Non-Monetary (Self consumed) 
G.D.P. is 3.2% "based on assumptions of higher per capita 
food consumption In re meat and fish. 
5) Population increase is calculated at 2.5$ annually 
1954-1966. This rate is assumed to hold through 1981 
in '"'ork For Progress, partly on the basis that the past 
increase has been 2.2'? natural end 0.3$ immigration and 







10) Changed estimates of volume of rental housing. 
11) "Price" changes 1964-1956. Rise - aftermonth 
1965 drought. Also shift of certain items 
(including milk) to monetary sector. 
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TABLE 3 - INVESTMENT PROJECTIONS 1966 - 1971 





% 1 INCREASE IN 
VALUE ADDED 
(£000, 000) 
AGRICULTURE/LIVESTOCK 21.0 9.1 21. 2 
FORESTRY/FISHING/ 
HUNTING 1.0 .4 1.1 
MINING/QUARRYING 3.0 1.3 2.1 
MANUFACTURING 45.0 19.5 14.5 
AGRICULTURAL PROCES-
SING ( 8.0 ) (3.5) (2.6) 
FOOD MANUFACTURING ( 6.0 ) (2.6) (2.7) 
MI SCELLANEOUS MANUFA-
CTURING (31.0 ) (13.4) (9.2) 
ELECTRICITY 23.0 10.0 i 2.2 
CONSTRUCTION 8.0 3.5 3.9 
COMMERCE i 14.0 | 6.1 15.6 
TRANSPORT/ COMMUNICATION I 40.0 17.4 3.4 
GOVERNMENT/SERVICES 50.0 21.7 15.7 
RENT2 j 25.0 10.9 I 2.4 
TOTAL 230 100 82 
TOTAL EXCLUDING FIRST 
TWO SECTORS 208 90.5 59.7 
GROSS! 
C/O 
1 . 0 
(3.1) 
RATE OP GROWTH OF 
FIXED INVESTMENT3 
RATIO ADDED FIXED 
INVESTMENT/ADDED MONETARY G.D.P. 30% J 
NOTES: 1. Special Formula applied to passenger cars treating some-
what less than half as investment. 
2. Basically construction of rental housing. Excludes owner 
self huilt and occupied and prohahly grossly underestimates 
owner huilt with hired labour or small contractor. In 
this it is consistent with past investment data. Excludes 
government supplied housing listed in preceeding category. 
3. This was originally postulated from a 1966 target of £35 
million equal to 1965 preliminary estimate. The new iy65 
estimate Is £32.3 million. The 1965-1966 target becomes 
8.4% not 0%. Possibly more critical, about £2 million in 
government investment scheduled but not carried out in 











AGRICULTURE/LIVESTOCK1 50.0 17.9 21 # 2 2 # • jt I 
FORESTRY/FISHING/ 
HUNTING2 1.8 i.i 1.6 
RENT 3 30.0 ; 10.7 (3.0) 10.0 j 
INVENTORIES4 16.4 ; 5.9 
! H — ji > 
i _ J 
REVISED TOTAL 281.2 
, 
100.0 82. 6 J 
1 
NOTES: 1. Addition of £29 million. Agriculture - Small Former 
investment in working capital, implements, annual "crop 
improvements £10 million (say 250,000 at £25, 750,000 ^ 
at £5); Tree Crop direct labour - Coffee £7 - 8 million, 
Tea £ 2.5-3.0 million, other £.5 - 1.0 million. 
Livestock - additional cattle £1-5 million, Upgrading 
and other dairy oriented improvements £2 - 3 million, 
other stock (including poultry and "bees) £ . 5 - 1 million. 
Working capital and livestock are estimates of stock 
in_cr_e_ase i.e. net investment. Of this £29 million 
perhaps £5 million represents cash payments and £24 
million either direct labour invested in monetary sector 
production or "natural increase". 
2. Addition £.8 million. Assumes 1.4 C/0 Fishing and 1.3 
Forestry as minimum plausible. Probably £.4 - .6 
direct labour investment. 
3. Apparant 1965 residential construction (non-government) 
£5.5 - 6.0 million. 1966 - 1971 trend £5.5 - 7.0 yields 
£30 million. C/0 held at 10.0 yielding G.D.P. alteration. 
4. 20$ of increase in G.D.P. (Monetary). 
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These are national savings. Retained Foreign 
earnings ore included in Foreign Investment 
Income (Net) and Foreign Private Capital Inflow. 
This assumes non-fixed investment Development 




See Table 3. 25 A of direct Labour /Natural Increase 
Investment assumed to "be in 1971. 
25/j of .Added Monetary Fixed I assumed in 1971. 
Represents either added savings (reduced consumption) 
as posited here or larger international balance gap. 
As per note 2. Inventories are semi-explicitly lumped 
with consumption in V-'or:-; For Progress. 
C. MONETARY INCOMP PROjr.CTIONS1 (PER PLAN) 
(so00jOOO) 
1966 1971 Annual Growth Rate 
1966-1971 
Wages - Salaries 55 83 8.75 
.African Agricultural 
Operating •Surpluses 72 96 5.0% 
Other Operating 
Surpluses and Self 65 93 7.2$ 
Employed 
Rents 5.5 8 7.4% 
Total 197.0 280 7.2$ 
NOTES: 
Apart from the Rents line the only Plan figure is the 
8.7$ Wages - Salaries growth. The 1966 magnitudes are 
estimated from Background To Bud/ret 1966-67 a jus ted by 
Plan GDP data. The African Agricultural Operating 
Surplus growth rate Is assumed to be marginally less 
than that of Agriculture-Livestock - Processing because 
of increasing Corporate-Plantation share. Other 





TABLE 5. RESOURCE MOBILIZATION/INVESTMENT SOURCE 
.AND USE 
A. INVESTMENT FINANCE - PER PLAN (5000,000) 




















2 . 0 






( 7.0 ) 
( 3.5 ) 
(32.5 ) 
3.6 
0 . 2 
13.2 
- 1.6(Surplus) 
NOTES: l. National Savings are from the plan figure of 12A 
rate in hase year. Either this includes reinvested 
Foregign earnings or a leakage abroad of National 
savings is anticipated In 1966 or the rate is 
below 12,(as apposed to "little more than") or a 
combination of these. 
2. Approximate Estimates. Public 1966 is on two 
fiscal years. Central Government -.7 and + 2.5, 
Marketing Boards -3.3 and 0. (The +2.5 and 0 
are optimistic). 
- 1 6 -
B. INVESTMENT FINANCE - ADJUSTED1 (£000,000) 
1966 1971 
Fixed Investment 38.0 68.7 
Non-Inv e s tm en t 
Development 3 1.5 2.0 
Inventories 2.4 4.1 
Defense Hardware/ 
Buildings 3 3.0 1.0 
Total of above 44. 9 75.8 
National Savings 30.1 55.8 
Reinvested Foreign 
Earnings 2.0 3.6 
Other Foreign Private 
(Net) -0.2 0.2 
Official Capital Net 7.0 13.2 
Reserves 4.1 -
Closure Gap 1.9 3.0 
NOTES: 1. See Tables 3 - B, 4 - B. 
2. Assumes shortfall of £1 million in Public Sector 
Investment (per Plan) in 1966. 
3. Not included, in Plan allocation of resources either 
in Recurrent Consumption or Fixed Investment. The 
government surplus goal covers Non-Investment 
Recurrent but the Marginal Savings/GDP rate combined, 
with Balance of Payments Projection does not. 
Defense hardware and buildings are "excluded." 
throught the PL an unless it changes the definition 




D. FINANCING DEVELOPMENT SPENDING - .ADJUSTED 
Foreign Local " Gap" Total 
1. Central Government 50 40 — 90 
Plus Defense 8 - - 9 9 
Plus Inventories - 1 - 1 
Adjusted Government 50 41 9 100 
2. Parastatal 20 40 _ 60 
Plus Inventories - 2.4 - 2.4 
Parastatal Total 20 42.4 — 62.4 
3. Private 15 75.0 90.0 
Direct Investment - 24.4 - 24.4 
Adde d Mone t ary - 10.4 - 10.4 
Inventories - 13.0 - 13.0 
Private Total 15 122.8 — 132.8 
4 Total 85 206.2 9 300.2 
NOTES: 1. See Tables 3-B, 4-B 
2. Trend 1966-1971 3.0-2.0-2. 0-1.5-1.5-1. 0 
3. These might tend to appear in Recurrent Extenditure. 
This cannot he reconciled directly with Table 4 or 5B 
because of apparant inconsistency in handling of 
Non-Investment Development Finance. If one calculates 
the Gap Trend 1966-1971 per V B (Reserves use plus 
closure gap): it is about 6.0-5.4-4.8-4.2-3.6-3.0 summing 
to £22.5 million over plan period. This is of order 
of magnitude of £10 million Non-Investment Development 




Private (Net)1""" 1. ,8 3.8 17.0 
Public (Net) 7. ,0 13.2 13.6 
BASIC BALANCE -4. ,1 - -
RESERVES (+ = reduction)6 4. .1 
NOTES: 1. Sectoral Index Nutibers (approximate) 
1966 1971 
Food 100 80 
Consumer Manufactures 100 100 
Raw Materials 100 170 
Fuel 100 150 
Construction Materials 100 140 
Capital Goods 100 175 
2. Hie growth rate of East African imports consistent with 
a constant trade deficit is 3.9;A If these imports grow 
at 5.7% the Common Market trade gap would go to £9.6 
milli on v s £7. 5 million in 1966. 
3. The Coverage Adjustment of £5 million (1966) has been 
divided: £2.0 Unrecorded Imports; £0.5 Unrecorded 
Invisibles; £1.5 East/Eastern African Remittances(up to 
125,000 remitters including about 100,000 in at least 
part time wage employment). 
4. Includes Reinvested Profits of Foreign Owned Firms. 
5. If this represents African worker remittances, then the 
Private Remittance Fall (£4.9 to 2.7 million) is 
unreal!stically high. 
6. Uganda Public Sector free reserves on January 1, 1966 
did not exceed £8.2 million (net of £2.0 sinking Funds 
and £3.2 overdraft). Adding £5 - 5.5 million net from 
East .African Currency Board dissolution yields £13.2 -
13.7 million less £4.1 leaves £9.2 - 9.7 vs a Bank of 
Uganda statutory requirement of £9.0 million currency 
backing. Securing a working margin of , say, 5% of 
imports plus cover for 40; o added currency (parallel to 
GDP) suggests needed reserves of £16 million odd in 
1971. Even allowing a £2.5 million overdraft and 
£2.5 million IMF drawing leaves the total at £14.2 - 14.7 
assuming no uncovered deficit after 1966. In fact the 
trend deficit series from 1966 to 1971 (the basis of the 
accounts i_s trend) is on the order: 4.1 - 3.2 - 2.4 -
1.6 - 0.8 A o.O totalling £12.1 million, quite apart 
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